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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Zuatney Gonzalez appeals from the judgment entered upon her convictions for 
two counts of criminal possession of a financial transaction card.  She challenges the 
district court’s order granting her credit for time served from the date of her arrest on the 
charges until entry of judgment.  
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state filed a criminal complaint charging Gonzalez with criminal possession 
of a financial transaction card, burglary and grand theft.  (R., pp. 7-8.)  A magistrate 
issued an arrest warrant, which was served on March 3, 2016.  (R., pp. 9, 19.) 
 The state thereafter filed an information charging criminal possession of a 
financial transaction card, burglary and grand theft.  (R., pp. 38-39.)  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Gonzalez pled guilty to two counts of criminal possession of a financial 
transaction card, the second charge being an amendment of the grand theft charge.  (R., 
pp. 56-66.)  The district court imposed sentences of five years with one year determinate, 
concurrent with each other and with sentences imposed in Canyon County.  (R., pp. 77-
79.)  The district court awarded credit for “time served in the Bannock County Jail on this 
charge.”  (R., p. 78.)   
 Gonzalez filed a Rule 35 motion seeking credit for time served.  (R., pp. 84-85.)  
Gonzalez alleged she was arrested in Canyon County on September 28, 2015; that the 
warrant in this case issued October 21, 2015; and that she remained incarcerated in 
Canyon County until March 9, 2016, when she was transported to Bannock County.  (R., 
pp. 84-87.)  She requested credit for time served from the issuance of the arrest warrant 
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(October 21, 2015) until she was in custody in Bannock County on March 9, 2016.  (R., 
p. 84.) 
 The district court granted the motion for credit for time served in part.  (R., pp. 
90-95.)  The district court found that Gonzalez was arrested in Canyon County on 
September 28, 2015, and charged with several theft-related counts there.  (R., p. 93.)  The 
complaint in the instant case was filed in Bannock County on October 21, 2015.  (Id.)  
The arrest warrant in this case was served on Gonzalez on March 3, 2016.  (R., p. 94.)  
Gonzalez was sentenced on the Canyon County matters on March 7, 2016.  (R., p. 93.)  
After applying the relevant legal standards, the district court concluded that time in 
custody prior to March 3, 2016, was attributable to the Canyon County charges.  (R., pp. 
94-95.)  The district court concluded that Gonzalez was entitled to credit for pre-
judgment time served from March 3, 2016, the date of service of the arrest warrant in this 
case, until May 2, 2016, the date of sentencing in this case.  (R., p. 95.)   
 Gonzalez filed a timely notice of appeal from the order partially denying her 








 Gonzalez states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Gonzalez’s motion for credit 
for time served? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Gonzalez’ motion sought credit for time served from the date of issuance of the 
warrant until her transfer to Bannock County.  The district court awarded time served 
from the service of the arrest warrant until sentencing. On appeal Gonzalez seeks credit 
from the time the Canyon County jail was notified of the existence of the warrant.  Is 












 In her motion before the district court, Gonzalez sought “credit for the time sat 
[sic] in Canyon County from October 21, 2015, (date of warrant) to March 9, 2016, 
(transferred to Bannock County) for a total of 134 days.”  (R., p. 84.)  The district court 
awarded Gonzalez credit for pre-judgment incarceration from the service of the arrest 
warrant until the entry of the judgment.  (R., pp. 90-95.)  On appeal Gonzalez abandons 
the theory she presented below and claims she is entitled to credit from December 11, 
2015, the date she claims she was “being held in Canyon County, on the Bannock County 
charges.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)  Because the theory Gonzalez presents on appeal was 
not presented to the district court, it is not preserved for appellate review. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review.”  Simono v. House, 160 Idaho 788, 791, 379 P.3d 1058, 1061 
(2016) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
C. Gonzalez’ Claim That She Is Entitled To Credit For Time Served From The Time 
The Canyon County Jail Was Notified Of The Bannock County Warrant Is Not 
Preserved 
 
 “Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the 
parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.”  
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (internal 
quotation omitted).  The theory presented below was that Gonzalez was entitled to 134 
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days’ credit for time served from the date the arrest warrant issued on October 21, 2015, 
until she was transferred to Bannock County to answer these charges on March 9, 2016.  
(R., p. 84 (“Defendant is asking for credit for the time sat [sic] in Canyon County from 
October 21, 2015, (date of warrant) to March 9, 2016, (transferred to Bannock County) 
for a total of 134 days.”).)  The theory presented on appeal is that Gonzalez is entitled to 
82 days’ credit for time served from December 11, 2015, the date she claims she was 
“held” on the Bannock County charges, until she was served with the warrant on March 
3, 2016 (presumably in addition to the time granted by the district court).  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 5.)  Even a cursory comparison of the motion filed below to the argument raised 
on appeal shows they are based on different theories, and therefore the issue presented on 
appeal is not preserved for appellate review. 
 
D. Even If Preserved, Gonzalez Has Failed To Show Error 
 
 “Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain language.  That language 
is to be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning.  If that language is clear and 
unambiguous, the Court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any statutory 
construction.”  State v. Flores, 162 Idaho 298, ___, 396 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2017) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  Gonzalez was entitled to credit for time served for pre-
judgment incarceration “if such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense 
for which the judgment was entered.”  I.C. § 18-309(1).  This plain language “applies to 
all offenses that provide a basis for the defendant’s incarceration.”  State v. Brand, 162 
Idaho 189, ___, 395 P.3d 809, 812 (2017).  Whether the offense provides a basis for the 
defendant’s incarceration is determined by application of a two-part test:   
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first, the defendant must have been incarcerated during the intervening 
period from when the arrest warrant was served and the judgment of 
conviction was entered; and second, putting aside any alternative reason 
for the defendant’s incarceration, the relevant offense must be one that 
provides a basis for the defendant’s incarceration. 
 
Id. at ___, 395 P.3d at 812-13 (bolding added).  Gonzalez’ incarceration in Canyon 
County prior to service of the arrest warrant in this case does not meet this test.  Gonzalez 
was not incarcerated for the Bannock County charges until her arrest on the warrant 
issued in relation to those offenses. 
 Indeed, this case is indistinguishable from “Scenario 1” as laid out in Brand: 
Defendant is already in custody on unrelated charges. He is served with an 
arrest warrant which requires defendant to post bail. Defendant does not 
post bail and remains in custody until sentencing. Defendant is entitled to 
credit from the date of service of the warrant through the date of 
sentencing. 
 
Id. at ___, 395 P.3d at 813 (bolding added).  The district court did not err by granting 
credit for time served from the date Gonzalez was served with the arrest warrant until the 
date she was sentenced. 
 Gonzalez argues that she should have been granted credit for time served starting 
on December 11, 2015, “for the time she was being held in Canyon County, on the 
Bannock County charges.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5; see also pp. 8-9.)  The first flaw in 
this argument is factual.  As noted above, Gonzalez did not claim below that the 
December 11, 2015, date was relevant to her motion.  (R., pp. 84-85; Tr., p. 36, Ls. 5-18.)  




not happen on that date.  (R., pp. 93-95.)  On appeal she relies on one document,1 
apparently a jail record related to her custody in Canyon County, submitted with the 
motion to show her September 28, 2015, arrest date there. The document also contains an 
entry under the title “Holds” that provides a “Clearance Description” of “WENT TO 
BANNCOCK COUNTY,” a “Code” of “Other County Hold,” an “Enter Date” of 
“12/11/2015 08:01 PM” a “Clear Date” of “03/09/2016 07:33 AM,” a “Clear By” “S 
PFEIFER” and an “Enter By” “K EDWARDS.”  (R., p. 87.)  Gonzalez’ claim this 
evidence of an entry of unknown provenance and unknown meaning is proof positive she 
was in custody on the Bannock County charges, even in the absence of further proof, the 
state’s opportunity to present evidence on the unraised claim, and the lack of factual 
findings by the district court, fails.  
 The second flaw in Gonzalez’ argument is legal.  She relies substantively on the 
Brand opinion for her claim that she is entitled to credit for time served prior to her arrest 
on the charges in this case.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.)  She acknowledges that the first 
prong of the test articulated in that case is “the defendant must have been incarcerated 
during the intervening period from when the arrest warrant was served and the judgment 
of conviction was entered,” but argues that this test somehow does not require service of 
the arrest warrant.   (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8 (quoting Brand, 162 Idaho at ___, 395 
P.3d at 813).)  The district court made no error in starting the credit upon service of the 
arrest warrant, as specified in Brand, instead of at some time before that. 
                                            
1 Gonzalez also cites to another document that is apparently a minute sheet from the 
Canyon County case (Appellant’s brief, p. 8 (citing R., p. 20)) which was not submitted 
to the district court in relation to the motion for credit for time served.  So not only is 
Gonzalez seeking to present a new theory, she is basing it on different evidence than her 
motion below.   
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 Gonzalez cites no law for the proposition that entry of the notation “Other County 
Hold 12/11/2015 08:01 PM” in what appears to be Canyon County jail records 
constituted an arrest in this case.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.)  Gonzalez has cited no law 
indicating that she was incarcerated in this case prior to being arrested.  Putting Gonzalez 
and the Canyon County jail on notice of the intent to serve the Bannock County arrest 
warrant prior to her release from the Canyon County jail did not render her incarceration 
“for the offense” in this case.  Her argument that an entry entitled “hold” in a jail record 
constituted incarceration in this case fails as a matter of fact and law, even if it were 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
granting in part Gonzalez’ motion for credit for time served. 
 
 DATED this 25th day of August, 2017. 
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